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Abstract: 
In some jobs individual workers have control over revenue, effort and productivity. These jobs 
include professional firms for law, medicine and consulting. They include personal services in 
areas from hair styling to taxi driving. The firm offers contracts that allow for a sharing of risks 
and rewards. These incentives include a split of output between the firm and worker and 
employee ownership. For U.S. real estate agents, a choice is available between splitting revenue 
with the firm or retaining 100 % above a fixed prepaid minimum. These are equity and 
sequential debt contracts. Under the sequential debt contract, effort increases but output per hour 
declines. Separately, agents increase effort and productivity if offered ownership in the firm, 
effectively a claim on others’ performance. 
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Introduction 
Some jobs allow individual workers control over revenue, effort and performance. Performance 
includes effort and productivity or output per hour. These jobs include professional firms in law, 
medicine, consulting and architecture. The individual professional is a revenue generator. That 
includes the billable hour for the professional and the revenue per service performed by the 
doctor. 
Individual revenue generation is not confined to the professions. The salon has its stylists and 
manicurists. The gym offers its trainers. The taxi company has its cabdrivers. The National 
Income and Product Accounts for the United States for 2010 indicates that services are nearly 
four-fifths of total output. 
The firm offers contracts that allow for a sharing of risks and rewards. These incentives include a 
split of output between the firm and worker and employee ownership. With individual revenue of 
the lawyer or taxi driver available, the employer has a choice of offering a proportional split or 
allowing the employee to retain 100 %. The 100 % retention is in exchange for an up-front fixed 
payment. In effect, proportional equity and sequential debt contracts are not confined to financial 
markets. They govern millions of employees who go to work every day. 
The application of these contracts is to real estate agents. These agents are offered an 
employment contract with two incentive features. One is to choose between a proportional split 
of revenue as against 100 % of revenue in exchange for a fixed payment. The other is for a stake 
in the firm, a claim on other agents’ net income. 
A 100 % revenue payout and ownership are contract provisions for the employed small business 
operator. A 100 % payout offers the employee to retain all revenue in exchange for fixed 
payments to the firm. Ownership offers a stake in the firm’s profit. Because the firm is typically 
specialized in one industry, ownership provides incentives to contribute to teamwork and 
cohesion. The 100 % payout contract has the opposite effect. The nominal employee receives all 
of the revenue and has less of an incentive to work as part of a team. Consequently, there are 
potential conflicts between the two types of compensation. 
There is a two-stage structure leading to performance. In the first stage the employed small-
business operator selects the contract. That determination depends on exogenous characteristics 
including demographic variables, experience and financial position. In the second stage the 
individual’s performance is measured by revenue conditional on the contract. Controls are 
included for local market conditions, size of firm and individuals’ characteristics. Ownership 
increases the incentive to work synergistically and a 100 % payout rewards an individual focus 
on revenue generation. Whether both conditions separately contribute to performance or are in 
conflict is testable. 
The sample includes 3,020 U.S. real estate agents surveyed in spring 2008. They are employees 
but have contracts offering ownership and 100 % revenue payouts. In the first stage a probit 
equation estimates the probability of taking ownership in the firm and a 100 % payout of 
individual revenue. The second stage estimates performance conditional on the contract. The 
contract has two separate inverse Mills ratios for the conditional probabilities of earning a split 
and ownership. Performance is individual revenue before and after expenses and income taxes. 
The application addresses identification issues that plague selection problems. In the classic 
labor supply model, in the first stage a person is choosing whether to work or not. In the second, 
the person chooses how much to work. The problem is that similar variables affect both 
decisions, leading to identification problems. In the application here, there are several blocks of 
variables, including for the firm, market location, and for the demographics of the person. The 
firm offers the contract, but cannot use the demographics in the selection. Demographics include 
protected variables for gender, age, marital status, race and ethnicity that employers cannot use 
in setting working conditions. In the second stage the worker’s performance is based on these 
demographic variables along with household income and tax rates. 
There are four main conclusions. First, while offering ownership increases productivity, a 100 % 
payout contract does not. In a 100 % payout contract the agent cannot focus on individual 
income generation because of managerial responsibilities associated with running a small 
business. In contrast, ownership generates higher individual revenue. 1 Accepting more revenue 
and expenses is dissipative. Second, the results are robust to whether revenue is defined before or 
after expenses borne by the nominal employee. The improved performance of owners is not 
because of a difference in expenses. 
Third, the contract is concentrated in certain ethnic and demographic groups. The probability of 
having ownership and receiving 100 % of individual revenues rises by 1.4 % for 1 year of 
experience, though at a decreasing rate. Wealthier individuals are more likely to be owners. 
Experienced workers take both parts of the contract. Women are less likely to be employed 
entrepreneurs. African and Asian Americans are more likely to participate in the ownership part 
of the contract. 
Fourth, finance theory suggests that a sequential debt-equity contract orders priorities and 
incentives. Monitoring is facilitated by the debt-holder being paid with a priority claim. Here, the 
results do not always confirm greater output from sequential payment. Performance is lower 
when service workers receive 100 % of the revenue in exchange for a fixed payment. 
Section “Background” has background literature. Section “Specification” describes the model. 
Section “Empirical Application and Data” details the data on the contract and empirical 
application. The findings are reported in Section “Findings”. Section “Concluding 
Remarks” provides implications and conclusions. 
Background 
Employment growth rate in personal services in the United States since 1990 has been almost 
twice that of all jobs. There were 232,000 people employed as taxi drivers in April 2011, up from 
190,000 in the 1990 Census. The cabdriver typically retains all revenue during a shift, renting the 
taxi from an owner. 2 The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports 820,000 employed as barbers, 
stylists and at salons in April 2011and projected to grow by 15 % to 2018. An additional 10 % of 
all employment in the United States is in professional and business services where this model 
predominates. In professional services, the lawyer or doctor operates as an individual revenue 
generator with an employing firm paying the expenses. 
In 2010 more than half of all doctors and two-thirds of new medical residency graduates worked 
at hospital-owned practices where expenses are centrally managed.3 The American Bar 
Association confines ownership of law firms to attorneys.4 Instead of being a conventional small-
business operator hiring staff and paying rent, the doctor or lawyer operates an individual small 
business focused on revenue inside a larger one. The parent firm has separate contracts offering 
each employee a share of profits and individual revenue. 
At professional services firms including accounting, law, consulting, architecture and medicine, 
employees are expected to generate revenue. The parent firm covers expenses. Firms hiring Yale 
Law School graduates expect billable hours of 1,700 and 2,300 a year.5 A lawyer billing 2200 h 
at $300 each generates $660,000 annually. For a lawyer being paid one-third of billings, a 
reported salary including benefits is $220,000 a year. This is not strictly a salary, but instead a 
revenue-sharing contract. The split is not limited to one-third. While atypical for new hires, the 
lawyer can receive up to 100 % of gross revenue in exchange for making a fixed payment to the 
firm. Once becoming a partner or shareholder the lawyer additionally has rights to ownership, or 
a claim against the firm’s profit. The firm is covering operating expenses for the office, facilities, 
technology and support. 
For such nominal employees, the risk of self-employment and covering both expenses and 
revenues are reduced. Although there has been a long-term rise in self-employment, this 
phenomenon may be attributable to rising costs of taxes and benefits (Blau (1987)). The effect of 
tax rates is mixed. Fölster (2002) finds that higher marginal tax rates reduce self-employment by 
lowering returns to entrepreneurial activity. The growth of nominal employees operating small 
businesses coexists with the rise in self-employment.6 Ajayi-Obe and Parker (2005) find that 
when given flexibility, even in self-employment workers tend to put in more hours and effort. 
In medicine, the rationale is to provide incentives to generate patient billings while freeing 
doctors from office paperwork. Ittner et al. (2007) examine compensation structures in medical 
practices.7 The central management and taking of expenses by the parent firm allows the revenue 
generator to use skills and creativity as opposed to standardization. 
Baker and Winkler (2012) examine the conditions under which workers will cooperate while on 
the job. They find that cooperation depends on the level of job commitment. Cooperation is 
relevant among real estate agents in sharing information and listings. This cooperation is 
restricted if some agents are receiving high proportions of compensation and commissions. 
Walker (2009) notes that professional and personal services offer opportunities for flexibility. 
That flexibility does differ by gender. Men tend to be employed in professional services where 
compensation is higher. Women are employed in personal services where compensation is lower. 
Entrepreneurs are individuals seeking opportunities in the discovery and exploitation of 
profitable opportunities. Entrepreneurship’s boundaries are based on the individual, 
opportunities, technology and the environment (Busenitz et al. (2003)).8 The business, 
professional and personal services firm focuses on the individual, even as the rote tasks are 
centralized. 
While these structures mitigate risk, entrepreneurs are not necessarily viewed as willing risk 
takers. Schumpeter (1934, 137) claims that “The entrepreneur is never the risk bearer. The one 
who gives credit comes to grief if the undertaking fails. Risk-taking is in no case an element of 
the entrepreneurial function.” Nevertheless, the employed small-business arrangement is 
consistent with entrepreneurs taking calculated risks (Chell et al. (2001)), Wennekers et al. 
(2005). In contrast to other studies, Berglann et al. (2011) includes partly self-owned limited 
liability companies in their study of the origins and returns of entrepreneurship. Using this more 
expansive definition, entrepreneurship is profitable but with a larger variation. Cressy (2004) 
suggests that entrepreneurs have decreasing absolute risk aversion. Rauch and Frese (2007) find 
that the willingness to take risk does not increase the probability of success. Personality traits are 
determinants of success, including the need for achievement, motivation and a willingness to 
take risks. In Villette and Vuillermot (2009) entrepreneurs minimize risk through predation, 
taking advantage of market imperfections and pursuing them extensively. 
The highly successful operate where there are barriers to entry but with access to capital. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) note that the receipt of a large gift or inheritance increases the 
probability of becoming self employed. The probability of entrepreneurship increases 2 to 3 % 
when the province of working population density is doubled. 
Entrepreneurs value autonomy, providing a rationale for the 100 % payout contract. But 
autonomy has its cost. Lazear (2005) proposes that the entrepreneur becomes a jack-of-all-trades 
who has to be competent in many areas rather than just one. Also, that valuation of autonomy 
indicates that entrepreneurs earn returns below those from holding a passive index fund 
(Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)). The lower return is in addition to the cost from not 
being diversified. The firm is taking the risks for this employee (Zahra and Pearce (1994)). Hurst 
and Lusardi (2004) and Polkovnichenko (2007) note that those with low wealth are discouraged 
from becoming small-business owners despite low-risk opportunities. Gormley et al. (2010) find 
that avoidance of loss explains why saving is high in poor communities. People bypass profitable 
opportunities even when risk is minimal. 
Specification 
The contract has a split s of individual revenue and an ownership stake p. The limit is with a 
100 % payout and s = 1. The split is predetermined before the employee determines revenue. 
There is a recursive structure with the expectation of correlation between the 100 % payout 
contract and ownership so it is constructed as a bivariate probit. The first equation addresses 
whether the employee opts for 100 % control of individual revenue or instead chooses a split. 
The second is based on whether the agent is an owner. This equation includes demographic, firm 
and market demand and technology variables. The contract is negotiated before performance 
during the year is known. 
Given the contract choice, the second step is its incentive effects. This step is modeled using a 
sample selection regression with the dependent variable being the logarithm of individual 
revenue. The independent variables include dummy variables for ownership and 100 % payout 
contracts and self-selection terms for each from the bivariate probit. Because the equations are 
recursive, identification problems associated with simultaneous equations are controlled. 
The first estimation step is for a 100 % payout of individual revenue. This decision d = 1 has 
determining variable z1=X1β1+ε1>0. The observed characteristics are X 1 with 
coefficients β 1 and error ε 1. Otherwise d = 0 and the agent splits individual net revenue with the 
firm. The decision for ownership in the firm where e = 1 is determined by z2=X2β2+ε2>0. 
Otherwise e = 0 and the agent has no ownership. The bivariate probit is 
 
Here Σ is the variance-covariance matrix of the errors. The variances are standardized at unity. 
The correlation coefficient between the errors for taking on debt and equity is ρ. 
The second step estimates performance in individual revenue conditional on the contract. 
Recovered from the first step are two inverse Mills ratios for each contract provision on the 
100 % payout and ownership. These ratios are m 1 and m 2 with respective 
coefficients λ 1 and λ 2. The fitted inverse Mills ratios from the first-stage regression are variables 
in the income equation in the second step as 
lnY=Xβ+δ1d+δ2e+δ3ed+λ1m1+λ2m2+ε. (2) 
The variables X determine performance with parameters β. The dummy variables are d, e to be 
on a 100 % contract or to receive equity. The interaction term between the two provisions is ed. 
The self-selection conditional probabilities of receiving 100 % of individual revenue and 
ownership equity are m 1, m 2. The error is ε. 
Empirical Application and Data 
Real estate agents are employees of the firm where they work. They are not paid on salary but 
receive a split percentage of the gross revenue produced.9 The firm retains the remainder. Agents 
have the choice of a 100 % payout contract. In exchange for retaining all revenue the agent 
makes an advance payment to the firm. There is a separate option for ownership in the firm. 
Some agents are the sole owners, similar to conventional entrepreneurs. 
These contracts are not unique to real estate agents, but are present in accounting, law, consulting 
and other business, professional and personal services. Real estate agents are selected as 
representative cases of these contracts. The industry has characteristics of other business and 
professional services. These include the degree of autonomy afforded, clear measures of 
performance in sales revenue, extensive competition within the industry, and the contractual 
nature of employment. 
The primary data are from a 2008 National Association of Realtors (NAR) survey of real estate 
agents.10 Respondents provided responses on the characteristics of their employing firms. The 
data are for the 2007 calendar year.11 Median single family home prices are provided separately 
by the NAR. Employment data are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The NAR and BLS data 
sets are matched by zip code for the bivariate probit and regression. An overview of the variables 
is shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Variable descriptions 
Demographic: 






Years of schooling 
Years of real estate brokerage experience 
Square of real estate brokerage experience 
Broker has a personal webpage for business (Personal webpage = 1) 
Real estate as second career (Second career =1) 
Number of residential investment properties held 
Number of commercial investment properties held 
Full-time work status (Full-time = 1) 
Agent is an associate broker (Associate broker = 1) 
Contract: 
100 % payout contract status (No split of commission with the firm = 1) 
Agent is a broker–owner (Broker-owner = 1) 
Income and Business Expenses: 
Annual gross income of the agent 
Annual household income of the agent 
Natural logarithm of the gross income of the agent (before business expenses and taxes) 
Natural logarithm of net income of the agent (after business expenses and taxes) 
Natural logarithm of business expenses of the agent 
Natural logarithm of annual household income of the agent 
Firm Characteristics: 
Independent franchise status (Independent franchise = 1) 
Natural log of firm size (Number of sales employees) 
Profit sharing plan status (Profit sharing plan = 1) 
Market Environment: 
Percent change in employment in the metropolitan in 2007 
Natural log of median metro area single-family house prices in 2007 
 
The independent variables are divided into five categories including contract, demographics, 
skills, firm, and the market environment. The contract variables include a 100 % payout, 
ownership, and the corresponding sample selections based on conditional 
probabilities. Demographics include marital status, gender, race and ethnicity. Skills are 
education, experience, whether real estate is a second career, full-time work status, and 
ownership of residential and commercial property. Skills encompass technology such as whether 
the individual has a separate website for real estate listings. The firm variables include size and 
dummy variables for a franchise and offering profit sharing. Market demand is captured by the 
natural logarithm of median metropolitan house prices and the percentage growth of local 
employment during 2007. The variables include those protected by employment legislation 
including race, ethnicity, gender and marital status. Variables not protected under law include 
experience, schooling, real estate as a second career, being an associate broker and full time 
work status. The natural logarithm of employment at the firm measures size. Market metro area 
characteristics include the natural logarithm of the median single-family house price and the 
percentage change in employment in 2007. 
The total effect in the bivariate model is for the probability of selecting ownership and a 100 % 
payout contract. For each characteristic there is a direct probability of selecting ownership. There 
is a separate indirect probability of ownership given the 100 % payout contract. The ownership 
and 100 % payout contract probit equations share as explanatory variables schooling, experience, 
marital status, gender, ethnicity, real estate as a second career and firm size. The ownership 
probit includes the natural logarithm of the median metropolitan house price, the percentage 
change in area employment and the natural logarithm of household income. The 100 % payout 
contract equation includes variables for associate broker status, real estate listings webpage, and 
full-time work status. These are related to ability and skills but not necessarily wealth. 
There are two stages. In the first, the agent receives a contract prior to performance. In the 
second, performance is determined. That first stage offers natural identifying restrictions. 
Contracts cannot be based on protected variables in the demographic characteristics. The firm is 
not permitted to use gender, age, marital status, race or ethnicity in determining the split with the 
employee. 
The second stage involves the employee’s performance. That performance may depend on 
demographics, but the firm cannot use them in setting the contract. The separation of variables 
allows identification to take place. The natural logarithm of gross and net revenue and business 
expenses are three separate dependent variables. The performance is conditional on having 
ownership, a 100 % payout contract and the conditional probabilities of both. 
Whether predetermined contract incentives lead employed small-business operators to be more 
productive is testable. Having to perform all tasks makes an agent potentially liable for added 
out-of-pocket business expenses incurred separately from the firm’s overhead. Ownership gives 
an employee an incentive to work with others while retaining an entrepreneurial incentive. By 
comparison, the 100 % payout contract reduces the incentive to work with others and leads to 
dissipative activity. 
Descriptive statistics are in Table 2. There are 3,020 agents in the sample. Those who have 
ownership represent 13.5 % of the sample. Of these at-work entrepreneurs, 407 agents or 13.5 % 
are owners. There are 348 agents or 11.5 % of the sample who are on 100 % payout contracts 
receiving all individual revenue. The remaining 88.5 % are on contracts splitting their individual 
revenue generated with the firm. Employed entrepreneurs have higher wealth. They own 1.81 
houses as investments, as compared with 0.98 in the overall sample. They own twice as many 
commercial properties. Their household income is 17 % higher than the overall sample. 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable All Owners 100 % contract 
Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs. 
Schooling 14.763 1.963 3020 14.853 2.008 407 14.678 1.950 348 
Experience 11.071 9.689 3006 16.225 10.859 405 15.960 10.635 346 
Experience squared 216.415 333.530 3006 380.857 437.842 405 367.474 419.148 346 
Married 0.722 0.448 3020 0.767 0.424 407 0.773 0.420 348 
Female 0.577 0.494 3020 0.445 0.498 407 0.471 0.500 348 
African-American 0.029 0.169 3020 0.049 0.216 407 0.040 0.197 348 
Hispanic 0.036 0.187 3020 0.029 0.169 407 0.040 0.197 348 
Asian-American 0.027 0.162 3020 0.042 0.200 407 0.014 0.119 348 
Real estate as second 
career 
0.962 0.192 3020 0.921 0.269 407 0.945 0.228 348 
Real estate listings 
webpage 
0.588 0.492 3020 0.703 0.458 407 0.716 0.452 348 
Resid. property 
investment 
0.988 2.391 3016 1.882 3.777 406 1.810 3.975 348 
Comm. property 
investment 
0.166 0.725 2999 0.552 1.396 404 0.285 1.248 347 
Full time 0.875 0.331 3020 0.914 0.281 407 0.882 0.323 348 
Associate broker 0.161 0.368 3020 0.032 0.176 407 0.129 0.336 348 
100 % contract 0.115 0.319 3020 0.364 0.482 407 1.000 0.000 348 
Broker-owner 0.135 0.342 3020 1.000 0.000 407 0.425 0.495 348 
Profit sharing 0.035 0.183 3020 0.118 0.323 407 0.017 0.130 348 
Independent franchise 0.378 0.485 3020 0.273 0.446 407 0.399 0.490 348 
ln(Sales staff size) 3.893 1.838 3020 2.296 1.706 407 3.102 2.034 348 
Ln(Median metro house 
price, $000) 
5.550 0.495 2121 5.530 0.486 285 5.445 0.407 274 
Percent Chg. metro area 
empl. 
1.009 1.398 2362 1.074 1.451 310 1.053 1.540 296 
Ln(Gross income) 10.612 1.080 3020 11.092 0.931 407 11.166 0.853 348 
Ln(Net income) 10.136 1.061 3020 10.556 0.982 407 10.583 0.989 348 
Ln(Business expenses) 8.858 1.387 2942 9.207 1.633 400 9.475 1.455 344 
Ln(Household income) 11.510 0.719 3020 11.673 0.675 407 11.711 0.633 348 
 
Findings 
Table 3 reports results the probability of taking the 100 % payout contract versus a proportional 
split. The selection decision is based on personal characteristics along with firm size and 
technology. The log likelihood for the equation is statistically significant at the 1 % level. 
Table 3 Probability of 100 % contract versus split 
Variable Probit equation Marginal effects 
Coeff. T-Ratio Coeff. T-Ratio 
Constant −1.3314b −4.115 −0.2240b −4.130 
Schooling −0.0056 −0.342 −0.0009 −0.342 
Experience 0.0590b 5.748 0.0099b 5.866 
Experience squared −0.0009b −3.136 −0.0001b −3.166 
Married 0.1327 1.803 0.0215 1.878 
Female −0.1980b −3.080 −0.0340b −3.023 
African-american 0.3690a 2.160 0.0770 1.806 
Hispanic 0.1906 1.192 0.0359 1.076 
Asian-american −0.2834 −1.219 −0.0398 −1.498 
Real estate as second career −0.0167 −0.109 −0.0028 −0.108 
ln(Sales staff size) −0.1193b −6.801 −0.0201b −6.857 
Associate broker −0.1778a −1.998 −0.0276a −2.170 
Real estate listings webpage 0.2319b 3.432 0.0380b 3.533 
Full time 0.0201 0.204 0.0034 0.207 
Log likelihood   −1073.30     
Chi square   202.59     
N   3006     
aStatistically significant at the 0.05 level 
bStatistically significant at the 0.01 level 
One additional year of experience increases the probability of taking the no-split contract by 
1 %.12 The impact is concave and decreasing with experience. Larger firms are less likely to 
offer the contract. Those with associate broker credentials are less likely to take them. In both 
cases, the probability of taking a 100 % payout contract falls by 2.0 %. Those who are married 
have a 2.2 % higher probability of taking a 100 % contract. Women have a 3.4 % lower 
probability of having the 100 % contract. African-Americans have a 7.7 % higher probability of 
retaining all individual revenue generated; the base for comparison is Caucasian agents. Asian-
American and Hispanic groups have no difference in probability of accepting a 100 % payout 
contract. 
Table 4 has the analogous one-way probit estimates for the probability of holding ownership in 
the firm. The log likelihood of the model is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The effect of 
experience on ownership is positive and similar to the 100 % contract results. An additional year 
of experience increases the probability by 0.9 %. 
Table 4 Probability of ownership 
Variable Probit equation Marginal effects 
Coeff. T-Ratio Coeff. T-Ratio 
Constant −1.3184 −1.501 −0.1836 −1.504 
Schooling 0.0163 0.735 0.0023 0.734 
Experience 0.0649b 4.491 0.0090b 4.569 
Experience squared −0.0010a −2.406 −0.0001a −2.438 
Married −0.0456 −0.450 −0.0064 −0.444 
Female −0.3682b −4.286 −0.0535b −4.092 
African-American 0.5416b 2.853 0.1054a 2.199 
Hispanic −0.2012 −0.930 −0.0245 −1.075 
Asian-American 0.5852b 2.933 0.1169a 2.233 
Real estate as second career −0.6306b −3.339 −0.1293a −2.496 
ln(Sales staff size) −0.3801b −14.890 −0.0529b −14.149 
Ln(Median metro house price in $000) −0.0975 −1.073 −0.0136 −1.072 
Percent Chg. metro area employment 0.0129 0.401 0.0018 0.400 
Ln(Household income) 0.1757b 2.670 0.0245b 2.669 
Log likelihood   −546.71     
Chi square   422.13     
N   1883     
aStatistically significant at the 0.05 level 
bStatistically significant at the 0.01 level 
African-Americans have a 10.5 % greater probability of ownership than non-Hispanic whites. 
The analogous estimate is 11.7 % higher among Asian-Americans. Women are 5.4 % less likely 
to have an ownership stake than men. Those for whom real estate is a second career are 12.9 % 
less likely to be an owner. Ownership probabilities are increasing in total household income and 
decreasing at large firms. 
The estimates of the probabilities of having a 100 % payout contract and being an owner are set 
as starter values for the bivariate probit. The estimates for the probabilities of having a 100 % 
contract and ownership are in Table 5. The correlation between the disturbances of ownership 
and retaining all generated income is 0.37. The Wald hypothesis that this correlation is zero has a 
t-statistic of 5.35, significant at the 1 % level. The first block of results is for ownership and the 
second for the 100 % payout contract, the analogues of Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 5 Probability of a 100 % contract and ownership 
  Ownership 100 % Contract Marginal effects 
Coeff. T-Ratio Coeff. T-
Ratio 
Direct Indirect Total Dummy 
Constant −1.1963 −1.394 −0.6587 −1.676 – – – – 
Schooling 0.0155 0.685 −0.0346 −1.721 0.0046 0.0030 0.0076 – 
Experience 0.0638b 4.100 0.0582b 4.102 0.0188b −0.0051a 0.0137b   
Experience 
squared 
−0.0009a −2.108 −0.0009a −2.417 −0.0003a 0.0001 −0.0002 – 
Married −0.0229 −0.235 0.1649 1.801 −0.0067 −0.0144 −0.0211 −0.0215 
Female −0.3558b −4.023 −0.2777b −3.487 −0.1046b 0.0242a −0.0804b −0.0818b 
African-
American 
0.5563b 2.753 0.1823 0.983 0.1635b −0.0159 0.1476a 0.1752* 
Hispanic −0.1686 −0.742 0.0413 0.242 −0.0496 −0.0036 −0.0532 −0.0491 
Asian-
American 
0.5560b 2.990 −0.3022 −1.270 0.1634b 0.0263 0.1897b 0.2344b 
Real estate as 
second career 
−0.6149b −3.165 −0.0808 −0.407 −0.1807b 0.0070 −0.1737b −0.2109b 
ln(Sales staff 
size) 
−0.3659b −15.965 −0.1365b −6.540 −0.1076b 0.0119b −0.0957b – 
Ln(Median 
metro house 
price in $000) 




0.0021 0.058 – – 0.0006 – 0.0006 – 
Ln(Household 
income) 
0.1402a 2.302 – – 0.0412a – 0.0412a – 
Associate 
broker 




– – 0.2013a 2.445 – −0.0175a −0.0175a −0.0176a 
Full time – – 0.0697 0.559 – −0.0061 −0.0061 −0.0061 
Log likelihood   −1193.91             






  5.35             
N   1,883             
aStatistically significant at the 0.05 level 
bStatistically significant at the 0.01 level 
The third column block of Table 5 contains the total effects of ownership and the 100 % payout 
contract. The total joint effect has direct and indirect components. The direct effect is through the 
ownership contract. One year of experience increases the probability of having both contract 
provisions by 1.88 %. The indirect impact from the 100 % payout contract reduces the joint 
effect by 0.51 %. The total effect of a year of experience is to raise the probability of having 
ownership and a 100 % payout contract by 1.37 %. Large firms have a 9.6 % lower probability 
of offering ownership and a 100 % contract. Total income and effectively wealth lead to a 
greater willingness to accept the contract. 
The marginal effects are taken at the sample mean. The rightmost column of Table 5 shows the 
marginal effect for dummy variables. The step is from 0 to 1 rather than being evaluated at the 
mean. The total effect for a 0 to 1 step produces similar results to those in the remainder of 
Table 5. Women have an 8.2 % lower probability of having a 100 % contract and an ownership 
stake than men. African- and Asian- Americans have 17.5 % and 23.4 % higher probabilities of 
having ownership and a 100 % retention contract than non-Hispanic whites. The probability is 
21.1 % lower among those who did not start their career in real estate. Marital status and 
schooling are not statistically significant. 
The performance of agents conditional on at-work entrepreneurial contracts is in Table 6. The 
first block of results has as dependent variable the natural logarithm of gross revenue derived 
from real estate sales for the year. The second block reports net revenue after individual business 
expenses not paid by the firm. The third block has the business expenses as the dependent 
variable. It tests whether the entrepreneurial contracts shift expenses from the firm to the 
individual. All three regressions are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. These results are 
estimated using ordinary least squares. 
Table 6 Performance conditional on employed small-business operator contract: OLS regression 
Variable Ln(Gross income) Ln(Net income) Ln(Business 
expenses) 
Coeff. T-Ratio Coeff. T-Ratio Coeff. T-Ratio 
Constant 8.8101b 25.883 8.3936b 24.521 6.3123** 13.271 
Schooling 0.0043 0.369 −0.0009 −0.079 0.0350a 2.154 
Experience 0.1003b 13.907 0.0879b 12.114 0.0590b 5.844 
Experience squared −0.0022b −10.652 −0.0018b −8.847 −0.0013b −4.642 
Married 0.1271a 2.545 0.1649b 3.284 0.2363b 3.377 
Female −0.1713b −3.721 −0.1741b −3.761 −0.1314a −2.040 
Black −0.2889a −2.535 −0.2021 −1.764 −0.4492b −2.849 
Hispanic −0.1494 −1.358 −0.1062 −0.960 −0.0361 −0.237 
Asian 0.0360 0.294 −0.0216 −0.176 −0.0691 −0.405 
Real estate as second career −0.1490 −1.221 −0.1772 −1.443 −0.0815 −0.480 
Residential property investment 0.0416b 3.743 0.0423b 3.792 −0.0068 −0.432 
Commercial property investment 0.0226 0.770 0.0059 0.199 0.0766 1.842 
Profit sharing −0.0181 −0.146 −0.0440 −0.352 0.1782 1.026 
Independent franchise 0.1084a 2.280 0.0805 1.683 0.1947b 2.927 
ln(Sales staff size) 0.0692b 5.349 0.0664b 5.108 0.1186b 6.564 
Ln(Median metro house price in 
$000) 
0.1428b 3.083 0.1604b 3.443 0.1750b 2.693 
Percent Chg. metro area 
employment 
0.0601b 3.503 0.0769b 4.455 0.0551a 2.283 
Broker-owner 0.3121b 3.505 0.2294b 2.561 0.2855a 2.284 
100 % payout contract 0.3928b 4.645 0.2515b 2.957 0.5555b 4.715 
Broker-owner × 100 % payout 
contract 
−0.2162 −1.441 −0.0533 −0.354 −0.0865 −0.413 
Log likelihood   −2577.60   −2588.17   −3110.26 
Chi square   441.99   374.68   190.82 
Adjusted R-squared   0.20   0.17   0.10 
N   1872   1872   1829 
aStatistically significant at the 0.05 level 
bStatistically significant at the 0.01 level 
Owners generate 24.8 % more revenue than non-owners. Those on 100 % payout contracts earn 
32.6 % more than those splitting revenue with the firm.13 After expenses and taxes, the additional 
income is 31.2 % and 39.3 % higher for owners and 100 % contracts. In Table 2, a univariate 
comparison reveals a 42 % higher net income for owners and 45 % more for 100 % payout 
contract agents. Employed small-business operators have almost 50 % more experience and two 
to three times investments in properties. These operators possess unobservable talents based on 
their different profile. From Table 2, 42.5 % of 100 % payout contract agents are owners. 
Further, 48.2 % of owners are on 100 % contracts. The least-squares regression coefficients are 
likely to be biased. Sample selection regressions are conducted based on the bivariate probit in 
Table 5. 
Table 7 reports performance conditional on selecting the employed small business operator 
contract. The two contract variables for ownership and a 100 % payout contract are included in 
the regression as independent dummy variables along with their self-selection conditional 
probabilities. There are four contract variables for whether an agent has 100 % retention, 
ownership in the firm and the self-selection conditional probabilities of each. There is also an 
interaction variable for the 100 % payout contract and ownership. 
Table 7 Performance conditional on employed small-business operator contract: sample 
selection regression 
Variable Ln(Gross income) Ln(Net income) Ln(Business 
expenses) 
Coeff. T-Ratio Coeff. T-Ratio Coeff. T-Ratio 
Constant 8.7129b 23.083 8.3092b 21.862 5.9918b 11.348 
Schooling −0.0057 −0.461 −0.0075 −0.602 0.0397a 2.290 
Experience 0.1045b 11.565 0.0902b 9.912 0.0488b 3.852 
Experience squared −0.0023b −10.457 −0.0019b −8.581 −0.0012b −3.944 
Married 0.1559b 2.978 0.1834b 3.477 0.2128b 2.895 
Female −0.1829b −3.272 −0.1786b −3.174 −0.0692 −0.881 
Black −0.3512b −2.998 −0.2470a −2.094 −0.4902b −3.016 
Hispanic −0.1133 −1.025 −0.0808 −0.726 −0.0245 −0.160 
Asian −0.1119 −0.842 −0.1215 −0.908 −0.0438 −0.236 
Real estate as second career −0.0427 −0.333 −0.1022 −0.793 −0.0413 −0.231 
Residential property investment 0.0408b 3.673 0.0417b 3.732 −0.0085 −0.535 
Commercial property investment 0.0184 0.628 0.0029 0.098 0.0749 1.799 
Profit sharing −0.0086 −0.069 −0.0378 −0.302 0.1725 0.993 
Independent franchise 0.1261b 2.636 0.0928 1.927 0.1987b 2.963 
ln(Sales staff size) 0.0914b 4.108 0.0835b 3.727 0.1524b 4.882 
Ln(Median metro house price in 
$000) 
0.1509b 3.258 0.1660b 3.559 0.1759b 2.702 
Percent Chg. metro area 
employment 
0.0590b 3.444 0.0761b 4.408 0.0540* 2.235 
Broker-owner 1.1825b 3.768 0.8367b 2.648 0.4929 1.122 
100 % payout contract −0.7526 −1.204 −0.4836 −0.768 1.4486 1.661 
Broker-owner × 100 % payout 
contract 
−0.1921 −1.025 −0.0490 −0.259 −0.3077 −1.171 
Lambda (Broker-owner) −0.3765a −2.518 −0.2677 −1.779 −0.1805 −0.864 
Lambda (100 % payout contract) 0.5305 1.710 0.3373 1.080 −0.4710 −1.087 
Log likelihood   −2562.00   −2574.98   −3098.19 
Chi square   473.19   401.06   214.96 
Adjusted R-squared   0.21   0.17   0.10 
N   1872   1872   1829 
aStatistically significant at the 0.05 level 
bStatistically significant at the 0.01 level 
The condition and performance is on having ownership and the 100 % payout contract. If 
ownership conveys additional productivity and performance, the agent has higher gross and net 
revenue. The 100 % contract defeats these within-firm effects even as the employed small-
business operator remains an employee. The agent has a reduced incentive to offer referrals, 
perform joint work on listings and sales, and engage in teamwork that leads to additional 
revenue. Gross revenue of owners is 118.3 % higher than non-owners on a split commission. Net 
revenue after business expenses is 83.7 % higher for at-work entrepreneurs. The main effect 
comes from having ownership. 
Conditional on ownership, the 100 % payout contract does not lead to higher performance. The 
coefficient is negative although statistically insignificant. That agent is becomes more of a 
conventional small business operator inside the firm. Because the firm offers limited or no 
support, there is no sharing of leads and teamwork. The agent is dissipating energy on activities 
where there is no comparative advantage. 
Unobservable or latent effects are captured by the conditional probabilities from the bivariate 
probit. The gross income of owners is lower than that of non-owners with equivalent 
characteristics. The negative coefficient implies that the gross income of owners would be higher 
were it not for the selection process that determines ownership. For the 100 % payout contract 
agents the sample selection coefficient in the gross income equation is positive but statistically 
insignificant. 
The effect of the 100 % payout contract and ownership on business expenses is reported in the 
last two columns of Table 7. Employed small-business operators do not have business expenses 
different from other agents. The firm is not shifting expenses to any contract class of employee. 
Performance is improved at larger firms and where the local economy is stronger. Gross 
revenues rise 0.091 % per 1 % increase in firm size. A 1 % increase in local house prices raises 
agent revenue by 0.15 %. A 1 % increase in employment increases revenue by 5.9 %. 
Table 7 reports the effects of demographics and skills. A year of experience raises the agent’s 
gross revenue generated by 10.5 %, and net revenue after expenses rises by 9.0 %. Women and 
African-Americans have lower gross and net revenue as compared with males and non-Hispanic 
whites. Each added residential property owned leads to a 4.1 % increase in gross and net 
revenue. 
Concluding Remarks 
Nominally an employee, the employed small-business operator is on the payroll, billing clients 
and sharing the revenue with the firm. The firm is providing overhead and infrastructure 
including tangible assets. At the limit the contract gives 100 % of individual revenue in exchange 
for paying rent to the firm. The employed entrepreneur can hold ownership in the firm itself. 
The employed small-business operator has higher household income. Evidence of a preference 
for autonomy and flexibility is also present. Individuals with an ownership stake work at smaller 
firms. Those who take on these risks are more experienced and less likely to have started a first 
career elsewhere. An ownership stake increases productivity whether defined in gross or net 
income terms. Conversely, the 100 % payout contract offers no gain in productivity conditional 
on ownership. Employed small business operators on the 100 % payout contract are dissipating 
resources by performing all entrepreneurial tasks. Preferences for being one’s own boss lead to 
diminished performance. 
The results are consistent across classifications. A strict entrepreneurial contract allowing an 
agent to retain all revenue in exchange for periodic fixed rental fees is not incrementally 
productive. A sharing contract leads to higher individual output and revenue. 
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Footnotes 
1. As in Lazear (2005) this entrepreneur has balanced skills. In the 100 % payout case there is a 
loss of focus from having to manage staff, diverting activity from revenue generation. 
2. De Nardi et al. (2007) provide evidence on the extent of self-employed entrepreneurial 
activity. At salons, it is typical for the firm to own the facility and the stylist either to rent the 
station or split revenue proceeds. For taxis, one entrepreneur owns the cab while renting it to 
another who drives it. 
3. The Medical Group Management Association (MGMA) Physician Placement 
Starting Salary Survey: 2010 Report Based on 2009 Data reports these results. The doctors are 
paid on a productivity basis analogous to lawyers and other professionals. Of the remaining one-
third of medical graduates from residencies, most work on salary or are engaged in research. 
Fewer than 10 % of graduates from residencies are working at conventional small business 
practices. 
4. Under the American Bar Association’s Model Rule 5.4, law firms are prohibited from selling 
equity shares to non-lawyers. Law firms are usually structured as professional corporations with 
shareholders with only attorneys being owners. The rationale is an ethical restriction prohibiting 
legal fee sharing. Similar rules occur in accounting firms. The tight-knit nature of these firms 
gives employed small-business operators incentives to hold stakes as opposed to outsiders even 
when there are no explicit prohibitions. 
5. See, http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/CDO_Public/cdo-billable_hour.pdf. To generate 
44 billable hours a week for 50 weeks of work, the associate is expected to be at work for 60. 
The remaining hours are spent in meetings, conferences, development or in non-billable time. 
6. Blau (1987) and Parker (2004) show that self-employment has been rising in the United States 
and United Kingdom since 1980, after secular declines associated with decreasing relative 
employment in agriculture. The phenomenon is not universal in developed countries. In Japan 
self-employment has been secularly declining, potentially attributable to an aging society (Genda 
and Kambayashi (2002)). 
7. Data are from the Medical Group Management Association. They find that the greater the 
group practice’s revenue derived from fixed-payment or capitation fees, the more the tendency to 
pay salaries as opposed to revenue splits. Incentives shift away from individual at-service billing 
to time spent with the patient. 
8. The desire to mitigate risk is a motivation for the at-work entrepreneurial contract. Caliendo et 
al. (2009) examine the role of risk aversion in becoming self-employed. Risk is less of a factor if 
the person was unemployed or not in the labor force. The positive correlation remains even after 
accounting for risk aversion (Kan and Tsai (2006)). 
9. The gross revenue or dollar commission generated from a sale is based upon the commission 
rate charged. The commission is typically split between the listing and selling agents, and the 
additional split occurs when the agents split their portions of the commissions with their 
respective firms. The commission rate is first established by the listing agent but may be 
renegotiated prior to the final sale. A buyer agent may receive the commission instead of a 
selling agent in the event that the buyer has entered into a contractual arrangement with an agent. 
10. The term agent is used generically to describe licensees in real estate. In practice there are 
two types of licensees, agents and brokers, depending on state regulations. Agents are not 
permitted to sell client properties on their own without oversight of brokers. A broker has a 
higher tier of licensing requirement. 
11. The NAR survey was conducted in spring 2008; the response rate was 7.7 % or about 10,000 
observations. The survey includes other real estate professionals such as appraisers and property 
managers. The final sample for this study is limited to agents who responded as primarily in 
residential real estate brokerage and paid on commission. This includes agents who receive at 
least 50 % of income from residential real estate and who receive at least a 50 % split with their 
firm. By doing so, the same becomes more homogeneous and eliminates from the sample those 
with virtually no real estate experience. 
12. The marginal effects of the coefficients from the probit equations in Tables 3 and 4 are 
calculated at the means. The exception is the dummy variables where the marginal effect is 
estimated by the step from 0 to 1. 
13. The marginal effect for dummy variables in the logarithmic specification of the dependent 
variable is approximated by the coefficient in the table. The exact marginal effect is (e x −1) * 
100 where x is the dummy coefficient. 
 
